Julio C. Teehankee (explicit only)
A century of party politics, four party systems, a multitude of parties; and yet Filipino political parties are still largely built around vast networks of well trenched political clans and dynasties that constantly switch their afiliation from one administration party to another in order to gain access to state resources and patronage. Far from developing into vehicles for programmatic citizen–party linkages, Filipino parties have evolved into patronage- based, office- seeking organizations largely built around dominant local political clans and warlords and anchored on clientelistic, parochial, and personal inducements rather than on issues, ideologies, and party platforms.
Scholars have prematurely dismissed the influence of clientelism in shaping political exchange in developing societies. In the Philippines, clientelism (usually expressed in the form of patronage politics) has proven to be more resilient and adaptive to the shifting contours of economy and society. In the heydays of the largely agricultural- based economy, dyadic ties between prosperous patrons and dependent clients at the local level formed the basis for the national two party system. With rapid urbanization came the decline of plantation- based patron–client ties based on consensual political exchange, and the emergence of the urban- based machine politics anchored on contractual political transactions.
A combination of weak central bureaucracy and strong local autonomy has contributed to the capture and weakening of state autonomy by competing and diverse social interests that include dominant social classes, political clans, powerful families, and other entrenched particularistic groups. These groups have managed to perpetuate themselves in power by building local political dynasties that constantly negotiate political exchanges with the national political leadership through the president and Congress. Through credit claiming and political machine building, a Filipino politician can translate pork barrel into political advantage leading to re- election.
In post- authoritarian Philippine politics, party- based national clientelistic politics continues to be based on local clientelistic and brokerage networks. The traditional patron–client factional dyads have morphed into more complex clientelistic cluster networks. The political operator has emerged as the main broker of clientelistic goods and services at the local level. Political operators are the wheels that crank the local political machines with money, jobs, and services as lubricant.
The root cause of the underdeveloped parties and party system in the Philippines is the weak institutionalization of citizen–party linkages. The weak party linkage in society results in the rise and fall of transient parties, a process that weakens democratic accountability and enhances clientelistic accountability. Citizen participation is the critical foundation upon which democracy is built. Political parties are vehicles for enabling citizens to engage and reconnect with the institutions and processes of democracy. Citizenship is nurtured on values, knowledge, and practice. Parties can perform an integral function in citizen education and voter education activities as part of their constituency- building activities. The challenge for political reformers is to foster greater citizen–party linkages by replacing clientelistic accountability with democratic accountability. A dificult but attainable task.
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