It will be of the most critical periods of Nicaragua's history: elections (or "elections") will be held 07 November this year, and incumbent ruler Daniel Ortega is vying for another term to extend his 14-year reign (excludes his previous 10-year rule from 1979 to 1990). Having strained relations with the West and warm ones with its rivals (notably Russia's Vladimir Putin), a victory for the far-left dictator would pose another big challenge to the international community, and it would be something like what is happening in Belarus.

 

To give you an idea of the events in Nicaragua, we start with the rise left-wing forces, one of the most influential in the Central American nation. In the early 20th Century, it was ruled by the occupying American forces. Augusto César Sandino got involved in guerilla warfare against the United States and managed to remove its troops in 1933, only to be assassinated by the Nicaraguan National Guard under Anastacio Somoza García the following year, who was loyal to the Americans and later became president in 1937. Decades later, an anti-American imperialism group was founded in 1961 and named itself after Sandino (i.e., the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)); it then ousted the Somoza dynasty in 1979, and the Front's Daniel Ortega became president.

Ortega only managed to reign over Nicaragua for almost 11 years after losing in the 1990 elections to former ally Violeta Barrios, the widow of the editor in chief of the newspaper La Prensa, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal (Chamorro IV), amidst the fall of Communist and Fascist dictatorships and the end of the Cold War. He, however, was able to return to power in 2007, during the Latin American leftist Pink Tide. He built healthy relations with socialist regimes like in Cuba and Venezuela.

And like in such countries, the FSLN regime met popular discontent as his rule became increasingly authoritarian, especially in 2018, as the masses protested against his authority. Three years later will be the "elections", and the country is seeing a brutal crackdown against the regime's opponents.

"Putin Law" and other draconian measures

As the polls were getting nearer, the regime's Congress passed a bill last October requiring entities receiving fund abroad to declare themselves as "foreign agents", thus it was nicknamed "Putin Law" as Ortega drew inspiration from his closest ally in crackdown against Russian dissidents. Two months later, Congress passed another prohibiting "traitors" (oppositors) from contending against the ruling regime. These laws came into fruition the following year, and the Foundation named after Violeta Barrios-Chamorro was one of the first bodies to be harassed (in February this year), on false accusations of money laundering.

Her daughter, Cristiana Chamorro, chaired the foundation and was the most favoured challenger to the Regime, and a warrant of arrest was issued against her; she was then detained on 02 June 2021. A wave of arrests followed: her brother Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Barrios (Chamorro V), her cousin Juan Sebastián, Arturo Cruz Sequeira, Felix Maradiaga, Victor Hugo Tinoco, Dona María Téllez, Suyen Barahona, and many others; as of mid-August 2021, arrested oppositors who are potential contenders to Ortega were 32, with Mauricio Díaz being the latest that time.

Not only dissenting politicians were imprisoned: people working for the media are also targets of the Ortega regime. Before the mass arrests, the office of the opposition paper Confidencial (with Cristiana's brother Carlos Fernando being editor-in-chief) was raided on 21 May 2021, along with the studios of the associated news programmes Esta Noche ("This Evening") and Esta Semana ("This Week"), a few days after investigations against Violeta's foundation were opened. A month later, authorities detained Miguel Mora of the banned television station 100% Noticias (Channel 15) (and who is also a potential presidential candidate). Meanwhile, Carlos Fernando fled the country to avoid arrest. In August, they sacked La Prensa's editor-in-chief, Juan Lorenzo Hollman, followed by a police raid of the paper's building due to trumped-up allegations of customs fraud and money laundering. By the end of the month, radio station Radio Corporación suspended two programmes linked to Confidencial as such all of these investigations were ongoing.

As former general and ex-ally of Ortega, Hugo Torres, noted: "I think Ortega has outdone Somoza. He has subordinated all the power to himself as Somoza never could. He has a bigger repressive apparatus than Somoza ever had".

Almost the same fate

And because Nicaragua is facing a political crisis that only worsens, what would happen after the "elections" may be like in Belarus. In fact, the course of events is similar to Ortega's ally near Russia.

Like in the Central American nation, Belarus' pre-election period was marred by arrests of possible contenders to Alexander Lukashenko. Renowned blogger and activist Sergei Tikhanovsky (Siarhei Tsikhanouski), the husband of the housewife-and-translator-turned opposition leader Svetlana, was one of the most favoured figures and was one of the first to be arrested (in May 2020, less than three months before the rigged elections), followed by detentions of opposition politicians Mikola (Mikalai) Statkevich and Pavel Severinets (Paval Sievaryniets) and businessman Viktor Babariko (Viktar Babaryka), all being potential candidates. The Cockroach (what Tikhanovsky calls the Belarusian despot) only left one person (Sergei's wife) to challenge him the most, underestimating her potential of victory just because she is a woman. Meanwhile, Lukashenko ally-turned critic Valery Tsepkalo (Tsapkala) avoided the possibility of arrest as he left the country.

Like how the Nicaraguan media is treated, journalism is under threat by the Lukashenko regime. The opposition channel Nexta was designated by the administration as extremist in October 2020, two journalists of the Poland-based channel Belsat (Yekaterina (Katsyaryna) Andreyeva and Darya Chultsova) were sentenced to two years early this year for their coverage of the post-election demonstrations, DW correspondent Alexander Burakov was detained thrice also for the same coverage, and independent news website TUT.by had its editor-in-chief Maria Zolotova (Zolatava) imprisoned and its office raided on 18 May 2021 as it was being investigated on false charges of tax fraud, before the regime applied the same fate like it did on Nexta. This is similar to the raids the Ortega regime had conducted in the offices of Confidencial and La Prensa on unfounded accusations.

And like in Nicaragua, Lukashenko gets much pressure from the civil society and the clergy (although the higher-ups of the Belarusian Orthodox Church, linked to the Putinist Moscow Patriarchate, is complicit unlike other churches in Belarus, whereas the Roman Catholic Church in Nicaragua is critical to the Ortega regime). This kind of pressure burst the Eastern European country's political environment, so the post-election mass protests were made possible after years of silence as the Regime showed its utter disrespect to popular will. Given that Nicaragua faced the same kind of protests in 2018, recent developments would provide opportunity for such demonstrations to return at a bigger scale after the "elections". A point of no-return may occur, and rallies may catch the attention of the international community; Western countries may then hurl another barrage of sanctions against the Ortega regime.

It's not, however, greatly similar to Belarus.

Belarusians were able to merge all opposing forces against their regime; during the campaign period, the wives of Babariko (Maria Kolesnikova (Kalesnikava)) and Tsepkalo (Veronika) had the back of Tikhanovskaya, and they three formed a triumvirate that one may replace the other should unwanted circumstances arrive. As the Belarusian opposition has one candidate, it threw support behind her (or them, as they were three). This unity in the opposition was sustained right after the elections and is until now; opposition groups (like political parties and exile entities) recognise Tikhanovskaya as leader, and her Coordination Council representing Belarus.

Meanwhile, Nicaraguan oppositors fail to convene among themselves to have a unified voice. You would not see coalitions like the National Coalition (CN), the Blue and White National Unity (UNAB), the Broad Front for Democracy (FAD), the Civic Alliance for Democracy and Justice (ACDJ) and the Alliance of Citizens for Liberty (ACxL) to group into one; maybe two or three of which but not all. All opposition groups decried Cristiana's arrest, but ACxL wants to proceed to participating in the polls even after the incident, whilst other groups anticipate electoral fraud and thus opt for a boycott instead (it took the former coalition disqualification last 07 August 2021 to no longer attempt in joining the elections). Division among regime opponents are giving the Nicaraguan masses uncertainty and therefore the authorities more confidence in pillaging the nation. It is possible for them to merge with one another right after the "elections", but they might just behave like their allies in left-wing-occupied Venezuela, who are also divided against one another.

 

There is, however, another probable similarity between situations in the two nations: the response of the international community will be bleak and insufficient. An initial thought on the Belarusian crisis was that it will be fast and they will be able to accomplish a swift regime change like their Ukrainian neighbours have done in 2014 (around three months), but it has been more than a year, and the international community, particularly the West, were only able to impose sanctions against the Cockroach' regime, unwilling to confront his superpower ally (Putin) as they do not believe in proper ways to achieve sustainable peace. It would only act on extraordinary events like the hijacking of Ryanair Flight 4978 (to arrest Roman Protasevich (Raman Pratasevich), one of Nexta's founders) and the harassment of sprinter Svetlana Timanovskaya (Sviatlana Tsimanouskaya) in the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo; news of the verdict against Babariko, the self-harm incident of activist Stepan Latypov, and the death of activist Vitaly Shishov in Kyiv have made through the international news, but Western countries made no action on such instances.

With the withdrawal of foreign forces in Afghanistan and the resulting return of Taliban, now under the sphere of Putin, in power, the credibility of the West and the international community is now put into question amidst their comeback attempt on upholding global freedom, and this puts democracy movements like in Belarus in danger-- it's like your major ally can betray you like it had betrayed Afghanistan. And of course, Nicaragua does not escape this risk.

Nevertheless, the international community cannot avoid a new headache in the immediate future, which will be Nicaragua, and it has to confront it. New problems just stack over one another during the COVID-19 pandemic: China, Belarus, Tigray, Myanmar, then Afghanistan, and Nicaragua will add. The strategy of limited and incomprehensive interventionism, the fear to confront, and rooting for the mere absence of war (which is not peace) never solves even one of these, but it gives more time for despots to improve and cause more injustice.

 

What is being done on addressing the Belarusian crisis cannot be applied on Nicaragua; it has to be more than the current action, and the international community should do far more than it performs on Belarus and all other issues.

 

Article posted on 07 September 2021, 08:53 (UTC +08:00).


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